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Do Pacific countries receive too much foreign aid?
Simon Feeny and Mark McGillivray
School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT University 
World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University
International aid donors are substantially 
scaling up the level of foreign development 
aid. Official development assistance (ODA), 
the most widely accepted measure of foreign 
development aid, increased from US$69.1 
billion in 2003 to an estimated record high of 
US$106 billion in 2005. The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) estimates that its Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) member 
countries will provide US$130 billion in aid 
by 2010 (OECD 2006). The UN Millennium 
Project calls for further increases in foreign 
aid to US$135m billion (UN Millennium 
Project 2005). Australia, the largest donor 
of aid to the Pacific, has pledged to double 
its foreign aid budget to $4 billion by 2010, 
subject to ‘the effectiveness of the application 
of additional resources’ (AusAID 2005). 
Pacific countries currently receive some 
of the world’s highest levels of aid, relative 
to the size of their economies. Levels of 
aid that account for more than one-third of 
GDP are not uncommon. The rising global 
aid budgets and increasing assistance 
expected from emerging donors such as 
China, Taiwan and India imply that aid 
levels in the Pacific will increase. Increases 
in the incidence of relative and in some 
instances absolute poverty—in its economic 
and other dimensions—provide an a priori 
case for increasing aid to the region. This 
case becomes stronger given the findings of 
recent empirical studies of aid effectiveness 
in the Pacific. These studies conclude that 
economic growth in the region would have 
been lower in the absence of aid (Gounder 
2001; Feeny 2006a, 2006b; Sugden and 
Pavlov 2006).1 While this does not suggest 
that all the region’s problems can be fixed 
by aid and there are many aspects of aid 
delivery that require fundamental reforms, 
these findings are consistent with the view 
that poverty in the Pacific would be higher 
in the absence of aid and the region’s 
poor economic performance should not 
be attributed to aid. This is also consistent 
with the findings of the majority of other 
studies that belong to the now rather 
large aid-growth empirical literature (for 
comprehensive surveys, see McGillivray et 
al. 2006; Addison et al. 2005; Clemens et al. 
2004; McGillivray 2003; Morrissey 2001).2
While the preceding findings are good 
news for donor and recipient nations alike, it 
is also clear from aid-effectiveness research 
that there are limits to the amounts of aid 
recipient countries can effectively absorb. 
A consistent finding from the literature is 
that the aid–growth relationship is subject 
to diminishing and eventually negative 
returns (for example, Hansen and Tarp 2000, 
AchIEvING GRoWTh IN ThE PAcIFIc
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2001; Lensink and White 2001; Dalgaard and 
Hansen 2001; Hudson and Mosley 2001; 
Dalgaard et al. 2004; Clemens et al. 2004). 
Estimates of the level of aid at which its 
incremental impact on recipient-country 
growth diminishes vary, depending inter 
alia on the time period and sample of 
countries under consideration; but it seems 
that this typically occurs at about 20 per 
cent of recipient GDP. In policy circles, it is 
also accepted that some recipient countries 
struggle to absorb the large amounts 
of foreign aid they receive efficiently. 
Indeed, the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2005 focused on the need 
for greater coordination and harmonisation 
of aid-donor activities to ensure that aid 
effectiveness in such countries was not 
hampered (OECD 2005).
This issue is of obvious importance to 
the Pacific, given the already high levels 
of aid provided and the prospects of even 
higher levels. Pacific countries have very 
small economies. It follows that what might 
seem to be a small or even inconsequential 
increment in aid in the context of the donor’s 
budget can translate into an enormous 
increase in aid relative to the size of the 
country’s GDP. This paper labels the level of 
aid that maximises its impact on economic 
growth as the ‘growth-efficient’ level.3 It 
estimates this level of aid using the findings 
reported in the recent aid-growth literature. 
These estimates are then compared with 
current aid allocations to Pacific countries. 
The paper proceeds by calculating the 
impact on growth that growth-efficient 
foreign aid allocations will provide. 
Foreign aid to the Pacific
Table 1 provides aid amounts relative to GDP 
for Pacific countries in periods since 1980. 
Most aid to the region has been bilateral, 
with Australia being by far the largest donor. 
Other major donors include Japan, France, 
the United States and New Zealand. Of all 
Pacific countries, Solomon Islands received 
the most aid relative to its GDP in 2004; it 
received aid to the value of 50.6 per cent of 
GDP. The comparatively large level of aid to 
Solomon Islands in 2004 is explained by the 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI), initiated in 2003 after 
civil and political unrest. Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Palau, 
Nauru, Tuvalu and Kiribati also received 
levels of aid in excess of 25 per cent of their 
GDP in 2004. Kiribati has received some of 
the highest levels in the world relative to its 
GDP; in 1990, it received aid in excess of 70 
per cent of its GDP.
In ratio terms, the level of aid flows 
to Pacific countries has, on average, fallen 
in recent decades (Table 1). In 1980, aid 
accounted, on average, for 30 per cent of 
GDP. This figure had fallen to 23 per cent by 
2004. Only four of the 13 countries listed in 
Table 1 received more aid relative to GDP 
in 2004 than in 2000. The recent pledges of 
increased aid to the region from Australia 
were in part a response to these declines. 
This should not imply, however, that aid to 
the Pacific is small in comparison with other 
parts of the world. Pacific countries receive 
some of the highest levels of aid relative 
to GDP—far higher than the international 
average. In 2004, foreign aid to developing 
countries averaged 1.3 per cent of gross 
national income (GNI).
Growth-efficient foreign aid
It is intuitive and sensible to expect that 
there are constraints on the amount of 
aid that can be absorbed efficiently. In 
recent years, aid-effectiveness studies have 
embraced this expectation by allowing for 
a non-linear relationship between foreign 
aid and growth. They typically estimate the 
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following equation
Į ǃ ǃ ǃ ǋ2 /1 2 3 1,...,i i i i ig a a Z i n       (1)
in which gi is per capita GDP growth in 
aid-receiving country i, ai is aid relative 
to GDP in that country, Zi is a vector of 
additional variables, μi is a residual, α is a 
constant and β1, β2 and β3 are coefficients. 
All variables are for a given period, t. The 
vector of additional variables typically 
includes the initial level of GDP per capita, 
measures of ethnic fractionalisation, the 
number of assassinations, institutional 
quality, macroeconomic policy indicators 
and regional dummies. The expected signs 
of β1 and β2 are positive and negative, 
respectively. Given these expectations, the 
hypothesised relationship between aid 
and growth described by Equation 1 is 
represented in Figure 1.
The figure depicts the expected 
relationship between aid provided to 
a recipient (ai) and the growth in the 
recipient’s per capita income (gi). The 
incremental impact of foreign aid on growth 
is positive at all levels of aid up to ai
*. From 
Equation 1, it follows that
 
1
2
ǃ
2 ǃ
*
ia
 
 (2)
This level is interpreted in the literature 
as the saturation level of aid. It can be 
interpreted as the unconstrained optimal 
level according to an allocation strategy 
that attempts to maximise rates of current 
per capita income growth in recipient 
countries. Put differently, it is the amount 
of aid that donors should provide to each 
recipient country if maximising current 
Table 1  Ratio of foreign aid to GDP for Pacific countries (per cent)
 1980 1990 2000 2004
Cook Islands .. 19.0 5.3 4.2a 
Fiji 3.0 3.8 1.8 2.4 
Kiribati 68.6 71.2 36.8 27.0 
Marshall Islands .. .. 58.3 47.2 
Micronesia (Federated States of) .. .. 47.1 38.1 
Nauru .. 0.3 12.2 35.7a 
Palau .. .. 33.6 15.4 
Papua New Guinea 12.8 12.8 8.1 6.8 
Samoa 16.6 23.7 11.9 8.5 
Solomon Islands 38.4 21.7 22.9 50.6 
Tonga 31.5 26.3 12.3 9.1 
Tuvalu 42.6b 53.5 32.9 42.6b 
Vanuatu 38.8 33.0 18.7 11.9 
Average 30.0 26.5 23.2 23.0
a Figures relate to 2003. 
b Figures relate to 2002. 
Notes: Foreign aid is defined as ODA. Data are unavailable for the remaining three Pacific ODA-eligible 
countries (Niue, Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna).  
Sources: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2006. International Development 
Statistics Online Database, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris; World Bank, 2006. 
World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC; Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2005. Key Indicators 
of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, Asian Development Bank, Manila. 
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income growth is their only objective and 
if the size of their total aid budget allows 
them to do so. This paper calls this level 
the ‘growth-efficient’ level of foreign aid. 
The negative incremental impact on growth 
beyond this level of aid is rightly associated 
with absorptive-capacity constraints within 
recipient countries. It is obvious from Figure 
1 that if donors want to maximise gi, they 
should provide aid up to and not beyond 
ai
*.
Although the impact of aid on growth 
is a key issue for aid effectiveness, the main 
criterion for assessing aid ought to be its 
contribution to poverty reduction. Economic 
growth should be seen as the means by 
which aid can reduce poverty and not as an 
end in itself.4 This paper acknowledges that 
the level of aid that maximises per capita 
income growth is not necessarily the level 
of aid that maximises growth’s incremental 
impact on poverty reduction. Although 
there is ambiguity about the precise link 
between growth and poverty reduction, it 
is assumed for the purpose of this paper 
that this link is positive at all levels at which 
the relationship between aid and growth is 
positive.
Moreover, there are many determinants 
of poverty reduction in addition to economic 
growth. Aid can influence many of these 
determinants and it follows that the level 
of aid that maximises its impact on poverty 
reduction is not necessarily that which 
maximises its impact on economic growth. 
Donors might, for example, want to target 
particularly poor groups. They might 
also want to support particular public 
expenditure that has a poverty-alleviation 
orientation. Such interventions might do a 
lot for poverty reduction, but might not be 
optimal in terms of current growth at the 
national level. Alternatively, donors might 
want to establish preconditions for growth 
and poverty reduction in periods later than 
the current one, on the grounds that growth 
in the short run might not be sustained 
in the long run. They might, for example, 
want to prevent a country sliding back into 
armed conflict. Donors might also wish to 
rebuild physical and human infrastructure 
in countries in which these variables have 
Figure 1  Aid, economic growth and per capita income
a i
*
g i
Growth efficient aid
a i
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reached a critically low level. It would seem 
that these arguments are applicable in the 
case of Solomon Islands. 
Considerations such as those just 
outlined might well provide a case for 
deviating from the growth-efficient amount 
of aid as defined above. Given, however, that 
any significant deviation from the growth-
efficient level represents an opportunity cost 
in terms of growth forgone, donors need 
to examine closely any large deviations if 
they are concerned about growth, seeking 
to ascertain whether they can be justified on 
valid poverty-reduction criteria. Continuing 
aid allocations to a country well in excess 
of the growth-efficient amount would 
appear to be difficult to justify, and might 
be interpreted as an indicator of a failed or 
failing recipient-level aid program.5
Empirical estimates and 
simulations
The empirical aid-effectiveness literature 
has increasingly relied on panel data 
econometrics, due in large part to the 
realities of developing-country data, which, 
in the majority of cases, do not permit robust 
time series analysis. The limitations of such 
an approach are well known and a degree 
of caution must be exercised in interpreting 
the results from it. The aid-growth literature 
is clearly no exception to this.6 A remarkable 
consistency has, however, emerged from 
studies conducted since the late 1990s. 
Almost all—which number more than 
50—conclude that growth would be lower 
in the absence of aid. This is in contrast 
with studies published earlier, which were 
often either inconclusive or contradictory. 
Any objective reading of the above-cited 
aid-growth literature surveys, which are 
extremely comprehensive in their coverage, 
will attest to this.7 Moreover, it is also 
clear from the recent literature that the 
econometrically more rigorous studies—
those providing the most robust results—
show that the cross-country relationship 
between aid and growth is as depicted 
in Figure 1. Among the studies that find 
evidence of such a relationship are Durbarry 
et al. (1998), Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), 
Lensink and White (2001), Dalgaard and 
Hansen (2001), Hudson and Mosley (2001), 
Dalgaard et al. (2004), Roodman (2003), 
Clemens et al. (2004) and Sugden and Pavlov 
(2006). The last of these studies looked at 
aid and growth in seven of the 16 Pacific 
aid-receiving countries (Cook Islands, Fiji, 
Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and 
Vanuatu) in the period 1982–2002. All of these 
studies estimate an equation of the general 
form of Equation 1.
The tasks of this paper are to estimate 
ai
*—the growth-efficient level of foreign 
aid—for recipient countries in the Pacific 
and then compare this level with the 
amounts of aid that these countries have 
been receiving. The first of these tasks can 
be accomplished in three ways: first, by 
obtaining estimates of a model of the form 
of Equation 1 using a more comprehensive 
data set than those used in pre-existing 
Pacific aid-growth studies and derive ai
* 
from these estimates. Second, derive values 
of ai
* from pre-existing Pacific aid-growth 
studies. Third, derive values of this variable 
from studies that utilise a larger cross-
country sample of countries that includes 
Pacific countries and countries from other 
parts of the world. 
The first option is ruled out on the 
grounds that the data required do not 
exist. The second was considered at length. 
Ideally, given the caution that should be 
exercised with panel-data econometrics, 
a reasonably large number of studies that 
provide roughly consistent results are 
needed. Precisely how large this number 
should be is a matter of judgment, but it is 
certainly greater than one. In the case of the 
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Pacific, however, there is only one study that 
provides the information necessary to derive 
ai
*: Sugden and Pavlov (2006). Although 
not reported in that paper, the value of ai
* 
corresponding to its econometric estimates 
is 48 per cent. Empirically advanced studies 
that have a comprehensive but not region-
specific focus, which use the same measure 
of aid used by Sugden and Pavlov (2006), 
provide results that correspond with an 
average value that is less than half this 
level. It needs to be emphasised that such 
a contrast does not necessarily imply that 
the analysis of Sugden and Pavlov (2006) is 
flawed or that the value of ai
* consistent with 
its results is necessarily wrong and should 
be ignored. While we do in part rely on it 
below, combined with simple intuition, it 
might be suggested that this value is too 
high to serve as a regional average.
This leaves the third option: to derive 
values of this variable from studies that are 
comprehensive but not regionally specific in 
terms of their country coverage. We initially 
turned to the nine studies listed above, 
immediately preceding Sugden and Pavlov 
(2006). From these studies we selected the 
following six: Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), 
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Dalgaard et al. 
(2004), Roodman (2003) and Clemens et al. 
(2004). These studies are widely regarded 
as being the most sophisticated, given the 
econometric techniques employed, inter 
alia allowing for the potential endogeneity 
of aid, and provide extensive robustness 
testing. Estimates of the values β1 and β2, 
from Equation 1 and the corresponding 
growth-efficient levels of aid are shown in 
Appendix Table A1. Each of these estimates 
is significantly different from zero, based on 
appropriate hypothesis tests.
The studies referred to in Table A1 use 
two different measures of aid: ODA and 
effective development assistance (EDA). 
Official development assistance is the sum 
of official grants and the full amount of 
concessional loans, while EDA is the sum of 
the former and the grant equivalent of the 
latter.8 Since the focus of the present study 
is ODA, we further narrow the selection of 
studies to Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), 
Roodman (2003) and Clemens et al. (2004). 
The average values of ai
* that correspond 
to the estimates of β1 and β2 obtained by 
these studies vary from 24 to 17, in the 
respective cases of Hansen and Tarp (2000) 
and (2001). We note that these differences 
can be attributed to different time periods 
and samples of countries, and also to model 
specification differences. The bottom line is, 
however, that they are to be expected and 
do not point to grounds on which we would 
clearly reject each of these estimates. Nor, 
equally, is there any reason to assume that 
one of these studies has more accurately 
estimated the relationship between aid and 
growth than the other studies. For these 
reasons, we take the average of the estimate 
of ai
* that corresponds with two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) and instrumental variable 
(IV) estimates of β1 and β2 obtained by these 
studies. These estimates are preferred as 
they have been obtained after controlling 
for possible endogeneity of aid receipts. 
This average, shown in the second-last 
row of Table A1, is 20.2 per cent. This is the 
estimate of ai
* against which real aid levels 
to the Pacific are compared.9 We emphasise 
that this is an approximation of the level 
of ODA, as a percentage of GDP, which 
maximises the contribution of aid to per 
capita income growth in the Pacific. It must 
also be interpreted as a regional average—a 
point we return to below.
Table 2 shows the differences between 
the level of aid Pacific countries received 
in 2004 and the chosen value of ai
*. It also 
provides the estimated impact of aid on 
growth (growth due to aid) at the real 
amounts and the estimated opportunity 
costs, in terms of growth forgone, of deviating 
from the growth-efficient amount.10 Two 
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observations emerge from Table 2. The 
first is that the average amount of ODA 
to the region would appear to be broadly 
consistent with a current income growth 
maximisation strategy. This observation is 
based on the similarity of the real level of 
aid to the region relative to GDP, which is 
23 per cent, and on the recognition that ai
*, 
the estimated growth-efficient amount, is 
an approximation. The difference between 
these amounts is only 2.8 percentage points. 
The estimated regional per capita income 
growth due to aid is 2.64 per cent. The 
estimated growth rate of providing ai
* to 
each country is only 0.33 per cent higher.
The second observation from Table 
2 is that while the overall level of aid to 
the region appears to be about right, the 
allocation among countries is not. The 
contribution of aid to growth becomes 
negative if more than twice the growth-
efficient amount is allocated.11 This is 
the case for Marshall Islands, Solomon 
Islands and Tuvalu. Solomon Islands is by 
far the most ‘over-aided’ country from a 
growth perspective, receiving ODA in 2004 
equivalent to 50.6 per cent of GDP—more 
than 30 percentage points in excess of the 
growth-efficient amount. Solomon Islands 
would still be over-aided in this sense even 
with the growth-efficient amount consistent 
with Sugden and Pavlov (2006), which is 48 
per cent. The estimated opportunity cost of the 
ODA allocation—the forgone income growth 
from not providing the growth-efficient 
amount of 20.2 per cent—is 5.55 percentage 
points. This is shown in last column of Table 
2. The equivalent opportunity costs of ODA 
to Marshall Islands and Tuvalu are 4.44 and 
3.14 percentage points, respectively. Three 
Table 2  Impact of growth-efficient aid, 2004
 Real aid ai
* Difference Impact of Impact on Difference 
  (ai ) 
 (ai
*–ai) ai on gi gi at ai
* (gi
*) (gi
*–gi)
Cook Islandsa 4.2 20.2 16.0 0.87 2.61 1.74 
Fiji 2.4 20.2 17.8 0.52 2.61 2.09 
Kiribati 27.0 20.2 –6.8 2.06 2.61 0.55 
Marshall Islands 47.2 20.2 –27.0 –1.83 2.61 4.44 
Micronesia (Federated States of) 38.1 20.2 –17.9 0.50 2.61 2.11 
Naurua 35.7 20.2 –15.5 0.95 2.61 1.65 
Palau 15.4 20.2 4.8 2.19 2.61 0.41 
Papua New Guinea 6.8 20.2 13.4 1.30 2.61 1.31 
Samoa 8.5 20.2 11.7 1.54 2.61 1.06 
Solomon Islands 50.6 20.2 –30.4 –2.94 2.61 5.55 
Tonga 9.1 20.2 11.1 1.62 2.61 0.98 
Tuvalub 42.6 20.2 –22.4 –0.54 2.61 3.14 
Vanuatu 11.9 20.2 8.3 1.93 2.61 0.68 
Region 23.0 20.2 –2.8 2.28 2.61 0.33
a real aid data relate to 2003 
b real aid data relate to 2002 
Note: Aid is expressed as a percentage of GDP.  
Sources: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 2006. International Development 
Statistics Online Database, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris; World Bank, 2006. 
World Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, DC; Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2005. Key Indicators 
of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
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of the remaining 10 Pacific countries listed 
in Table 2 are also over-aided from a pure 
growth perspective. They are Kiribati, 
Federated States of Micronesia and Nauru, 
which received ODA allocations that 
were 6.8, 17.9 and 15.5 percentage points, 
respectively, above the estimate of ai
*. The 
forgone growth associated with these 
allocations is 0.55 (Kiribati), 2.11 (Federated 
States of Micronesia) and 1.65 percentage 
points (Nauru).
The seven countries that have received 
less than the estimated value of ai
* are Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu in 2004 (or 2003 
in the cases of Cook Islands and Nauru). 
Fiji, Cook Islands and Papua New Guinea 
were the most under-aided in 2004. The 
opportunity costs of this under-aiding in 
terms of growth forgone in these three 
countries were 2.09 (Fiji), 1.74 (Cook Islands) 
and 1.31 per cent (Papua New Guinea). The 
main point to be made here, however, is that 
aid can be scaled up to these countries and the 
dividend would be higher growth due to aid 
(although recent events in Fiji clearly mitigate 
against this—a point we return to below).
Policy implications
It is helpful to consider the policy implications 
of the results shown in Table 2. We focus 
initially on those countries that receive in 
excess of the growth-efficient amount. These 
results do not necessarily indicate that aid 
in 2004 was harmful to the countries that 
received more than the growth-efficient 
volume. Nor do they necessarily provide 
a sufficient case for reducing aid levels. 
There could be important non-growth 
considerations that justify the high levels 
of aid provided. There might well be 
valid developmental reasons other than 
growth promotion for the scale of 2004 
aid allocations to these countries. RAMSI 
would appear to provide an example. 
Stopping Solomon Islands from sliding 
back into armed conflict and establishing 
the preconditions for future growth and 
poverty reduction are valid reasons to trade 
off current economic growth. The case for 
keeping aid well above the growth-efficient 
level would, however, either be difficult to 
sustain or would be a sign of a failing aid 
program. 
Donors might also have additional 
information on the relationship between aid 
and growth that is recipient-country specific. 
That the growth-efficient levels depicted 
above are derived from average behavioural 
relationships drawn from cross-country data 
provides a powerful, additional case for 
deviations above them.12 Given, however, 
that any deviation from growth-efficient 
levels represents an opportunity cost in 
terms of forgone current growth, donors 
should examine closely any large deviations 
to ascertain whether they can be justified 
on alternative criteria. This is perhaps the 
fundamental message coming from the 
results shown in Table 2 concerning the 
countries receiving more than the growth-
efficient amount.
Donors supporting the Pacific countries 
that receive well in excess of the growth-
efficient amount face two policy choices. 
The first is to reallocate aid within the 
region, taking aid away from the countries 
receiving more than the growth-efficient 
amount and giving it to those that receive 
less than this amount. This is doubly 
beneficial: increasing growth to levels 
that would not otherwise be the case in 
both groups of countries. The second 
policy choice is to keep aid levels largely 
unchanged to these countries and attack 
those factors that cause diminishing returns 
in the aid–growth relationship that cause 
the aid–growth curve to bend downwards. 
There will always be limits to the amounts 
of aid recipient countries can efficiently 
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absorb. Donors can, however, attempt to 
increase absorptive capacities through a 
variety of means, such as by enhancing the 
capabilities of public sector officials dealing 
with aid, promoting greater accountability 
and transparency of aid activities, ensuring 
greater alignment of donor and recipient 
priorities, reducing the fragmentation 
and proliferation of aid-funded activities 
and, where appropriate, allocating aid via 
different channels within recipients and 
not relying primarily on the public sector. 
Such channels include the private sector 
and civil society organisations (Collier 
2002; McGillivray 2003). Donors can also 
address the well-known problems of Dutch 
disease. Large amounts of foreign aid can 
lead to a loss in the export competitiveness 
of recipients. Project aid directed towards 
the traded goods sector can help mitigate 
this impact of aid.
Donors face more straightforward 
policy options for the Pacific countries 
that currently receive less than the growth-
efficient amount. Aid to these countries 
can be scaled up—substantially so in a 
number of cases. As a result, the incremental 
contribution to growth will increase, albeit by 
successively smaller amounts, provided the 
growth-efficient volume is not exceeded. A 
number of caveats need to be added though. 
Recipient-specific information relating to 
the aid–growth relationships might provide 
a telling case against such increases. There 
might also be a compelling non-growth 
case against allocating more aid to some 
countries. Both of these criteria seemingly 
apply to Fiji, for example, given recent events 
in that country. Moreover, while increasing 
aid to a country increases its incremental 
contribution to growth, this clearly does 
not mean that donors should not attempt 
to increase absorptive capacity by attacking 
the factors mentioned above. If current levels 
of aid to all countries are to be maintained, 
however, the priority attached to increasing 
absorptive capacity in countries receiving 
more than the growth-efficient amount is 
greater in those countries.
Conclusion
This paper has estimated the growth-
efficient level of foreign aid that equates to 
the level of aid that maximises its impact 
on the rate of per capita income growth in 
recipient countries. Using findings from 
well-cited studies, the paper estimates that 
the average growth-efficient aid level is when 
it accounts for 20.2 per cent of a recipient’s 
GDP. In 2004, six Pacific countries received 
aid levels in excess of the growth-efficient 
level. Three received more than twice this 
amount, suggesting that the impact of aid on 
per capita income growth is negative. While 
there might well be valid developmental 
criteria for such aid allocations, or recipient-
specific information on the link between aid 
and growth that might justify such amounts, 
donors supporting these countries do need to 
look very carefully at these levels to ensure 
that forgone growth can be justified—that 
the opportunity cost in terms of growth 
forgone is outweighed by other benefits. The 
remaining countries appear to be under-aided 
so that aid to them can be scaled up, with a 
corresponding increase in the incremental 
contribution of aid to growth.
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Notes
1 Feeny (2006b) finds no evidence of foreign aid 
impacting on the rural sector in Melanesian 
countries, proxied by agricultural GDP growth; 
however, foreign aid is found to impact 
positively on overall economic growth.
2 See Paul (2006) for a survey of the theoretical 
literature.
3 This is similar to the term ‘poverty-efficient 
aid’, coined by Collier and Dollar (2002). 
A poverty-efficient aid allocation is one in 
which more aid is provided to poor countries 
with good macroeconomic policies than to 
others.
4 The same can be said for many other outcomes 
against which aid has been evaluated, 
such as its impact on recipient-country 
public expenditure, conflict resolution, 
macroeconomic adjustment and community 
empowerment. While important, these 
outcomes should be seen as means to the 
more fundamental end of reducing poverty.
5 As is clear below, estimates of the parameters 
of Equation 1 are obtained using cross-
country data. As such, the estimates, and the 
growth-efficient aid allocations they provide, 
are a cross-country average that applies to 
the typical recipient. Donors might have aid-
growth information on specific recipients that 
could provide a case for deviations from the 
average growth-efficient amounts. 
6 Criticisms specific to the aid-growth literature 
include treating aid from different donors as 
analytically equivalent, and not being able to 
take into account changes in the composition 
of aid over time. See Roodman (2003) for 
a methodological critique of some recent 
studies. 
7 This is not to say that the literature is 
unanimous in this finding, as a minority 
of recent studies fail to find a positive 
association between aid and growth (Brumm 
2003; Easterly 2003; Ovaska 2003; Rajan 
and Subramanian 2005). These studies are, 
however, very much in the minority and have 
been heavily criticised on methodological 
grounds. Nor is it to say that there are no 
remaining controversies in what has been a 
controversial literature. There is, in particular, 
much continuing debate and uncertainty 
about the conditions under which aid works 
best, and the literature is sadly deficient in 
this regard (McGillivray et al. 2006; Clemens 
et al. 2004; McGillivray 2004).
8 It remains a matter of speculation why the 
growth-efficient level of EDA is less than 
equivalent level of ODA.
9 It is also worth noting that the average 
corresponding with all nine studies cited 
above, which corresponds with 20.7, is only 
slightly higher than this value. Similarly, the 
average obtained of all estimates—be they 
obtained by the OLS, 2SLS or IV estimates 
of the four selected studies—using ODA as 
the aid variable, is 21 and that obtained from 
OLS is 22.6 (see Table A1).
10 The coefficients used in calculating the 
impact of aid on growth shown in Table 2 
have been calculated at β1 and β2 values of 
0.230 and -0.005695 respectively. They are 
based on the second set of Hansen and Tarp 
(2000) IV regression results, albeit with a 
miniscule adjustment to ensure that they are 
consistent with aid’s contribution to growth 
being maximised at ai
*. These results were 
used, given that they yield a value of ai
* that 
is closest to 20.2 of all those in Table A1 that 
have been obtained from either 2SLS or IV 
estimation.
11 The level of aid at which its marginal impact 
on per capita income growth falls to zero is 
–β1/β2. This level of aid is twice the growth 
efficient level provided by Equation 2.
12 Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) make this 
point in the context of their ‘poverty-efficient’ 
aid allocations. Note that these allocations are 
also derived from estimates of an aid-growth 
model. According to that model, and those of 
Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000), the impact 
of aid on growth is conditional on a state’s 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) score, and this relationship applies to 
all countries irrespective of how high or low 
this score might be. This result has since been 
disputed in the literature, with the majority of 
subsequent studies failing to find such a link. 
This is not to say that policies or institutions 
are irrelevant to aid effectiveness; merely, 
they appear not to matter in the way depicted 
by the above studies. McGillivray and Feeny 
(2006), for instance, find that policies and 
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institutions matter at only critically low CPIA 
scores. It is on these grounds, and because of 
the general lack of poverty data of any quality 
for fragile states, that this paper preferred 
to use the growth-efficient, rather than the 
Collier and Dollar poverty-efficient, aid 
levels.
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Table A1  Results of selected aid-growth studies 
Study, estimation technique and aid variable β1 β2 ai*
Hansen and Tarp (2000)    
 Table 4, Column 3, OLS, ODA 0.166 –0.003 27.7 
 Table 4, Column 4, OLS, ODA 0.165 –0.004 20.6 
 Table 4, Column 5, OLS, ODA 0.182 –0.004 22.8 
 Appendix B, Column 3, IV, ODA 0.236 –0.005 23.6 
 Appendix B, Column 4, IV, ODA 0.230 –0.005 23.0 
 Appendix B, Column 5, IV, ODA 0.265 –0.005 26.5
Hansen and Tarp (2001)    
 Table 1, Column 1.1, IV, ODA 0.238 –0.754 15.8 
 Table 1, Column 1.2, IV, ODA 0.241 –0.763 15.8 
 Table 3, Column 3.1, fixed effects, OLS, ODA 0.117 –0.301 19.4
Roodman (2003)    
 Table 4: reproduction of Hansen and Tarp (2001), 2SLS, ODA 0.250 –0.010 12.5 
 Table 12, with population included, 2SLS, ODA 0.520 –0.010 26.0
Clemens et al. (2004)    
 Table 4, Column 5, 2SLS, ODA 0.960 –0.059 18.1
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001)    
 Table 4, Column 7, IV, EDA 1.327 –0.126 5.3 
 Table 4, Column 8, IV, EDA 1.352 –0.127 5.3
Dalgaard et al. (2004)    
 Table 1, Column 3, 2SLS, EDA 1.350 –0.130 5.2 
 Table 1, Column 6, 2SLS, EDA 2.470 –0.100 4.3
Average OLS, IV and 2SLS, ODA   21.0 
Average OLS, ODA   22.6 
Average IV and 2SLS, ODA   20.2 
Average IV, EDA     5.0
Note: ODA is official development assistance; EDA is effective development assistance; OLS is ordinary least 
squares; IV is instrumental variables; and 2SLS is two-stage least squares.
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